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ABSTRACT
In a democratic country, economic policies succeed or fail depending
on the political support they receive.  Open trade policies that were
initiated and accepted years ago can be reversed in accordance with
the government's free trade conviction and popular pressure. How-
ever, popular pressure for or against open trade is affected by other
factors.  This paper attempts to link these factors with individual
preferences toward either more protectionism or greater trade liber-
alization.  Using ordered logit estimation of thousands of survey data,
the paper finds that gender, economic class, and urban population
negatively correlate with pro-trade attitudes in the Philippines. It also
notes that the effect of some of the demographic variables on protec-
tionist sentiment is markedly different from their effects among more
developed Western nations.
F
ilipinos as a people are very open to strangers and foreigners.  They take
pride in their so-called "Filipino hospitality," where they try to make
visitors feel at home and comfortable, even, at times, at great personal
cost.  But when it comes to trade, the Philippines is, ironically, relatively
closed. For instance, based on the average most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs,
the Philippines is no match to its ASEAN neighbors Singapore, Brunei, and
Malaysia—countries that have relatively low mean and median tariff rates. Rather,
the Philippines is among those with an average MFN rate higher than 10 percent.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 2
A scan of local newspaper articles shows a strong undercurrent of anti-globaliza-
tion sentiment, especially among those who belong to certain sectors of society.
Faced with this tendency toward protection, it would be worthwhile to examine
what lies behind certain people's protectionist ideals. What are the traits that lead
particular persons to be more anti-globalization than others?
This paper attempts to determine the characteristics that make individuals
either more protectionist or more open to free trade.  It examines the issue through
an ordered logit approach using data from the 2003 International Social Survey
Programme (ISSP) national survey in the Philippines.  The survey asks 1,200
respondents how they feel about limiting foreign imports. These responses are
then correlated with their demographic characteristics to establish some linkages
with individual trade policy preferences.
The number of studies that relate demographic characteristics to trade has
actually increased since survey data have been made more widely available in
recent years, but none have yet been applied specifically to the Philippine case.
Mayda and Rodrik (2001) and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001) use similar survey data
in 1995 across several countries to run huge panel data regressions and find that
personal characteristics such as gender, age, and social status are significant in
explaining trade policy preferences. Using various country survey data, Scheve
and Slaughter (2001) for the United States, Pasadilla (2002) for Switzerland, and
Balistreri (1997) for Canada all find that noneconomic variables significantly
explain their trade-related results.
A demographic understanding of how individual incentives and characteristics
affect trade policy choices is important, especially for policymakers.  If they believe in
the virtues of free trade, as many economists do, an understanding of how the general
public's trade opinion is formed can help policymakers cater their  pitches to the right
target groups and thus better gather support for trade liberalization programs.
The next section provides a background on the role of trade preferences.
Section 3 expounds on the data and methodology employed in this study as well
as briefly describes the theory behind the use of demographic and institutional
variables. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical work, and Section 5
presents the conclusions.
BACKGROUND
Economists tend to construct economic models that ignore political and institu-
tional realities. This perhaps explains why only economists nearly unanimously
extol the desirability of free trade.1  The reality is that there are but a few economies
1 In a 1992 study by Alston et al., more than 90 percent of economists who responded indicated a belief
that different trade barriers reduce general economic welfare.PASADILLA AND LIAO 3
in the world, e.g., Singapore and Hong Kong, that have trade policies close to
what economics textbooks preach. The majority pose some form of trade protec-
tion, either through the imposition of positive tariffs or through other nontariff
barriers such as liberal anti-dumping policies, dubious standards requirements,
and quotas.
The existence of political considerations can explain why free trade is virtu-
ally nonexistent. In some policy models, the trade policy that is adopted may not
be the economically optimal one but it is what clears the political market. The
political market consists of those that demand certain types of trade policy (e.g.,
interest group and businessmen) and those that supply it (i.e., policymakers under
a given institutional structure).  The policy that results is the outcome of the
demand and supply, in much the same way as price is the result of the demand and
supply of a commodity in a traditional economic market. This "political equilib-
rium" may be found in trade policies that create distortions. In usual economic
parlance, these are considered economic inefficiencies, but they persist as long as
they cause the political market to clear.
As in the traditional goods market, individual preferences for particular
trade policies ultimately affect demand for certain types of policies.  If certain
types of individuals prefer good A over good B in the goods market, so do
different types of individuals prefer certain forms of trade policies over others in
the political market.
This paper modestly contributes to this rich literature by describing the
characteristics of individuals that would have particular preferences for or against
trade openness in the Philippines.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This section presents the ordered logit model regression that maps different indi-
vidual characteristics to explain the probability of an individual being pro- or anti-
trade. First, it discusses the basic characteristics of the data, particularly the main
variable—the protect variable (as explained below).  It then proceeds to discuss the
methodological framework, the construction of variables, and the analysis of results.
Survey data, economic condition, and trade preference
The Social Weather Station (SWS) used multistage probability sampling to select
the 1,200 voting-age (i.e., 18 years old and above) respondents for the survey.
Covering the entire Philippines, the research body targeted 300 individuals each
from the National Capital Region (NCR), and the main islands of Luzon (excluding
NCR), Visayas, and Mindanao. The questionnaire contained more than 100 ques-
tions, but this subsection will discuss only the major policy variables. Table 1
presents the salient characteristics of the 2003 sample.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 4
Table 1. ISSP sample characteristics
Sample Share of Each
Characteristic (%)
Male 50.2
Mean age 39.4 years
Self-employed 32.1
Employed in public sector 8.9
Urban 54.1
Economic Class
      Class AB (richest) 0.4
      Class C 8.6
      Class D 66.1
      Class E (poorest) 24.9
Characteristics
The main variable or question that asks respondents how they feel about
limiting foreign imports (which is assumed to represent trade policy preference) is
designated as the protect variable.  The individual's answer uses a 5-point scale
(where 1= "strongly agree") for the question:
How much do you agree or disagree with the following state-
ment?  The Philippines should limit the import of foreign products in
order to protect its national economy.
Lower values for the protect variable indicate anti-trade sentiments, as this
would be taken to mean agreeing to limit foreign imports, while high values indi-
cate pro-trade preference.2
The 2003 mean value of the protect variable is 2.10, which leans toward
the more protectionist end, with 72.6 percent of the respondents preferring to
limit imports (Table 2).3
It must be acknowledged that the phrasing of the question may lend a pro-
tectionist bias to the responses. Such is the shortcoming of employing survey
data. However, since the goal of the study is not to prove or disprove that Filipinos
are generally protectionist, but rather to determine the factors behind the varia-
tions in responses of individuals, the results should hold as long as the bias is
uniform across respondents.4
2 Dropping the respondents who replied “don’t know” or “refused to answer” to the dependent variable
under consideration, the final number of observations left in the data is 1,180.
3 Percentage of people answering “strongly agree” (response=1)  or “agree” (response=2).
4 There were other questions in the survey that could also be taken to indicate trade sentiment.  When
asked whether they agreed that large international companies damaged local business, 52.1 percent
answered in the affirmative, with a mean of 2.55 in a range of 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).PASADILLA AND LIAO 5
Methodological framework5
Individual responses to the abovecited question on limiting imports are treated as
the dependent variable.  Given the discrete and ordinal variable response (i.e., 1 for
"strongly agree" up and 5 for "strongly disagree") in the dependent variable, the
study uses an ordered logit estimation.
Consider the anti- or pro-trade stance of an individual as a function of a
vector of characteristics X.  Furthermore, an individual's vote for or against open
trade is dependent on a marginal benefits and costs consideration, the income
effect of trade being an example. Since this marginal benefits/costs consideration
is generally unobservable, consider a latent variable regression,
where ε  has a standard logistic distribution with mean zero and variance one.
Although one cannot observe here the individual benefits of trade, one can
determine such from the survey data on whether or not the individual supports
open trade.  Presumably, in the case of strong agreement with limiting trade, the
trade benefits to the individual are not commensurate to the cost, or that y* < µ1 or
some cut-off point, while the benefits are much higher or y*>µ4  for those who are
Table 2. Frequencies of responses to a proposal to limit imports
       Response Frequency Percent Cumulative
percent
(1) Agree Strongly 393 33.3 33.3
(Anti-trade Position)
(2) Agree 464 39.3 72.6
(3) Neither Agree Nor 186 15.8 88.4
Disagree
(4) Disagree 101 8.6 97.0
(5) Disagree Strongly 36 3.0 100.0
(Pro-trade Position)
Total 1,180 100.0
When queried, meanwhile, on whether they believed that free trade led to better products, 58.7 percent
responded in the affirmative, leaving greater than 40 percent of the respondents with an unfavorable view.
The mean here is 2.40, where 1 means that the individual strongly agrees that free trade leads to better
products, and 5 indicates that the respondent strongly disagrees with the statement. It can be noted that
even with such positive phrasing, one cannot conclude that there is a particularly strong support for
globalization in the country.
5  This subsection follows the discussion in Mayda and Rodrik (2001), Green (2002), and Stata Reference
Manual.
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or,  given positive β j , an increase in X increases the probability of at least a fair
support for open trade.9
Variable construction
Given the 100-odd questions in the survey, several variables can be pinpointed as
having a theoretical link to trade policy preferences. The framework being used is
a loose interpretation of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,10 whereby it is expected
that demographic differences, just like differences in input ownership, will lead to
certain groups benefiting more greatly from trade than others. The groups receiv-
ing higher benefits are expected to have a stronger preference for free trade.
The dependent variable
As previously mentioned, trade policy preference is measured by the individual
response to whether the country should limit imports.  The five-point scaled re-
sponse is 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neither agreeing nor disagreeing, 4=dis-
agree, and 5=strongly disagree. This is called the protect variable, where higher
values imply greater pro-trade preferences, and lower values imply anti-trade ones.
The independent variables
There is a large set of sociodemographic data available from the survey, including
gender, age, subjective economic class, trade union membership, religion, political
affiliation, area of residence, employment in the public sector, unemployment,11
self-employment, and work status.  Many of these variables are similar to those
that have been found important in similar studies on other nations, and are thus
utilized in the models as well.
In particular, most studies have found that men, non-Catholics, public
officials, and relatively well-off people tend to favor open trade, while union
members, the old, and the rural population oppose it (Table 3).
9 Stata is the program of choice for running the regressions, and in this software, the constant is not
separately estimated but is rather subsumed by the cut-off values.
10 The theorem itself states that, assuming full employment both before and after trade, the owners of the
abundant factor of a nation will find their real incomes increasing and the owners of the scarce factor will
find their real incomes decreasing as input prices change.
11 It could be theorized, based on the framework, for example, that the unemployed may benefit from
liberalization in that it might increase the availability of jobs in the economy. Would this belief lead them to
be more pro-trade than the gainfully employed? The following estimation explores that question.
.
.
    ∂ X 
∂ Prob (y=4|X) = -[f(μ 4-Xβ ) -f(μ 3-Xβ ) ] β  
   ∂ X 
        ∂ Prob (y=5| X) = f(μ 4-Xβ ) β  PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 8
Table 3. Expected relations with open trade sentiments
Variable Construction Expected Sign Basis
Age Actual - Mayda and Rodrik (2001),
Older ones are less O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001),
pro-trade Pasadilla (2002), Balistreri (1997)
Gender 1=male, 0=female + Mayda and Rodrik, O’Rourke and
Men are generally Sinnott, Scheve and Slaughter
pro-trade (2001)
Relative Income 1=above sample median, + Mayda and Rodrik
0 otherwise Relatively higher
income groups
are pro-trade
Economic Class Class E=1, D=2, + Mayda and Rodrik, Balistreri
C=3, AB=4 Relatively higher income
groups are pro-trade
Religion 1=non-Catholic, + O’Rourke and Sinnott
0=Catholic Non-Catholics are more
pro-trade
Right-wing Party 1=right and far right, + Scheve and Slaughter
Affiliation  0 otherwise Right-wing affiliates are
more open to trade
Area of Residence 1=urban, 0=rural + Mayda and Rodrik, O’Rourke and
Those living in urban Sinnott, Balistreri
areas are pro-trade
Unemployment 1=unemployed, + Pasadilla,O’Rourke and Sinnott
0 otherwise Unemployed are pro-trade
Self-employment 1=self-employed, + O’Rourke and Sinnott
0 otherwise Self-employed are
pro-trade
Public Employment 1=nongovernment, + O’Rourke and Sinnott
0=government Public officials are
protectionist
Union Membership 1=nonmember, + Mayda and Rodrik, Scheve and
0=member Union members are Slaughter, Balistreri
not for open tradePASADILLA AND LIAO 9
REGRESSION RESULTS
The model
The study then went through several demographic variables that were tested and/
or found significant in other studies. The first model included standard demo-
graphics such as age, gender, economic class, religion, and affiliation with the
right. Dummy variables for work-related characteristics such as unemployment,
self-employment, employment in the public sector, and membership in a trade
union, as well as for area of residence, were added in the second model. A third
model, testing for the influence of income, included relative family income. A fourth
took into account relative personal income instead (Table 4).
Variables found to be significant in different specifications were gender,
economic class, personal income, area of residence, and employment in the
public sector.
Gender
Unlike results from other studies that find men to be generally more open to trade,
women in the Philippines are more likely to support a more open trade policy. More
specifically, being female increases the probability of disagreeing with trade
restrictions by anywhere between 2.0 and 2.412  percentage points (significant at
the 5%-10% level).
Several reasons can explain this distinct Philippine result. First, it has been
noted that the increased globalization has led to the "feminization of employment"
in developing countries because of the increased reliance on women's contribu-
tion in the labor force. For instance, Orbeta (2002), using Philippine manufacturing
subindustry level data from 1993 to 1997, finds that women in the manufacturing
sector are positively affected by export activities. It is then no surprise that the
influence of gender would be different from the results in the previously refer-
enced studies.
Second, women may also be more pro-trade based on the effects women
perceive as buyers. In a matriarchal society such as the Philippines, women are the
designated household managers and typically in charge of shopping for house-
hold needs. Thus, they would more easily observe the tangible changes that
globalization brings, including decreases in prices and a greater variety of avail-
able goods and services.
Economic class/personal income
The significance of economic class is affirmed in this study. Again, results are
different from those of studies on developed nations, where the higher classes







































0 Table 4. Regression results
Method Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  4
Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Ordered Logit
Variable                                                                     y = protect
dPr(y=5) dPr(y=4) dPr(y=5) dPr(y=4) dPr(y=5) dPr(y=4) dPr(y=5) dPr(y=4)
Age -0.0000839 -0.0001988 -0.0000469 -0.0001125 -0.0000508 -0.0001218 -0.0000595 -0.000143
-0.72 -0.72 -0.39 -0.39 -0.42 -0.43 -0.5 -0.5
Gender -0.0071275 -0.0168542 -0.006463 -0.0154783 -0.0063597 -0.0152395 -0.0037345 -0.0089658
1.94* -2.01** -1.79* -1.84* -1.75* -1.81* -0.99 -1
Economic Class -0.0083373 -0.0197425 -0.0053736 -0.012883 -0.0043667 -0.0104746 -0.0053811 -0.0129233
-2.68*** -2.85*** -1.79* -1.84* -1.38 -1.41 -1.8* -1.85*
Religion -0.0011912 -0.0028292 -0.0049342 -0.0119729 -0.0049052 -0.011908 -0.0048691 -0.0118336
-0.27 -0.27 -1.19 -1.19 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18
Affiliation with the Right 0.0005166 0.0012217 -0.0003185 -0.000764 -0.0005804 -0.001394 -0.0009733 -0.0023426
0.12 0.12 -0.08 -0.08 -0.14 -0.14 -0.24 -0.23
Locale -0.0143577 -0.0337841 -0.013524 -0.0318816 -0.0138049 -0.0325675
-3.01*** -3.33*** -2.88*** -3.12*** -2.98*** -3.29***
Unemployment 0.0269211 0.0582715 0.0265633 0.0576037 0.0235672 0.0517466
1.19 1.33 1.18 1.32 1.09 1.21
Self-employment -0.0001426 -0.0003418 -0.0002264 -0.0005432 0.0027505 0.006578
-0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 0.63 0.63
Public Employment 0.0136553 0.0341821 0.0133515 0.0334094 0.0120938 0.0301839
2.78*** 2.89*** 2.79*** 2.89*** 2.47** 2.52**
Trade Union Membership -0.0106828 -0.0245673 -0.0121362 -0.0277677 -0.0171683 -0.0385735





















Method Model 1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  4
Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Ordered Logit Ordered Logit
Variable                                                                     y = protect
dPr(y=5) dPr(y=4) dPr(y=5) dPr(y=4) dPr(y=5) dPr(y=4) dPr(y=5) dPr(y=4)
Relative Family Income -0.0035735 -0.0085754
-0.92 -0.92
Relative Personal Income -0.0080927 -0.0194627
-1.96** -2.02**
Pseudo-R2 0.005 0.005 0.0132 0.0132 0.0135 0.0135 0.0146 0.0146
No. of Observations 1067 1067 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056 1056
The table shows the estimated marginal probabilities of being pro-trade, given an increase in the value of the relevant regressor, holding all other regressors at their mean value.
The z-scores of the marginal effects are presented under each one. Asterisks pertain to significance, with * being significant at the 10 percent level, ** being significant at the 5
percent level, and *** being significant at the 1 percent level.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 12
were found to be more keen toward liberalization. In the Philippines, the higher
one's economic class, the more protectionist one becomes. This outcome may be
explained by remembering that those in the higher classes in the Philippines are
owners of businesses. These are the ones who have benefited from protection in
the past and are therefore likely to be wary of changes in the status quo. As
capitalists, they are naturally opposed to imports, which will provide competition
for the products they sell.
Similarly, those who earn above the median income are more protectionist
than those earning below it.  Based on Model 4 (Table 4), by moving from below-
to above-median income earner, the probability of respondents disagreeing with
import restrictions decreases by around 2.7 percent (significant at the 5% level). It
may be conjectured that those with high incomes are either owners themselves or
occupy high positions in specific firms and whose fortunes are therefore inti-
mately tied to the fortunes of these companies upon the opening of trade. High
earners, then, may benefit from their businesses' continued insulation from
competition, and thus do they have a more negative stance toward imports.
Urban/Rural
The area of residence—i.e., urban or rural—is yet another significant factor,
perhaps the strongest in the set of explanatory variables in terms of the signifi-
cance level. Being urban dwellers decrease the probability of disagreeing with
trade restrictions from 4.4 to 4.8 percentage points (significant at the 1% level).
Again, results differ from those of other nations, whose urban respondents were
more open to liberalization—presumably because of their more cosmopolitan
outlook—than their rural counterparts.
In the Philippines, those in the rural areas often find themselves employed in
agriculture, which explains why they do not feel strongly threatened by products
coming in from other countries. That is, since the demand for Philippine agriculture
outstrips the  supply, the country has to import considerable amounts of rice (and
other key products) from neighboring nations. Those who are in agriculture
therefore know and accept that there is room for both domestically produced
and imported grains in the market.
In addition, the poor infrastructure in the country makes the transportation
of such imports from ports more difficult, erecting natural barriers and allowing the
small-time farmers to still be able to market their goods with relative ease to neigh-
boring towns.13
13 Citing studies by Power and Sicat (1971) and Bautista, Power and Associates (1979), a referee
suggested that another reason for this divergence in opinion is that import substitution took place mainly
in urban settings, where the incentives were made more available. Hence, the urban population would
naturally be more opposed to liberalization.PASADILLA AND LIAO 13
Employment
Employment in the public sector makes a person more protectionist, decreasing
the probability of disagreeing with trade restrictions by 4.7 percentage points,
again significant at the 1 percent level and robust across various models. One
important implication of the removal of trade barriers is the reduction in govern-
ment revenues. With roughly 20 percent of government income coming from
import taxes and other import duties, a drop in resources will negatively affect
those employed by the public sector, mainly because the most likely reaction to
reduced funds is the trimming of the bureaucracy. Second, it can also be posited
that trade barriers bestow government employees a certain amount of power,
especially if they are recipients of requests with regard trade protection.  Trade
barriers allow public employees some rent-seeking behavior.  Such employees
would therefore not want to allow any breakdown in trade regulation to take away
their influence as bureaucratic middlemen.
The results of the model are supported by the descriptive statistics shown
in Table 5, where one can clearly see that the mean values and percentage of
respondents who are pro-trade are indeed significantly lower among males, urban-
ites, public sector employees, and upper classes. The gaps appear to be particu-
larly significant between those publicly and privately employed, as well as those
differing in economic class. There is a marked divide between those in the AB and
C classes, and those in the D and E classes, especially percentage-wise. Inter-
estingly, in the highest economic class, not one of the respondents indicated a
pro-trade stance.
Table 5. Descriptive statistics
No. of Mean Percentage Percentage
Respondents Pro-trade Anti-trade
GENDER
     Male 592 2.02 11.15 75.68
     Female 588 2.16 12.07 69.56
LOCALE
     Urban 733 1.99 10.78 76.53
     Rural 439 2.2 11.39 67.65
EMPLOYMENT
     Public sector 98 1.79 6.12 84.69
     Private sector 1074 2.12 12.1 71.6
ECONOMIC CLASS
     Class AB 8 1.88 0 75
     Class C 129 1.8 5.43 83.72
     Class D 750 2.1 12.53 71.87
     Class E 293 2.18 12.29 69.97
Notes: Values for percentage pro-trade were found by dividing the number of respondents who chose “4”
(disagree) or “5” (strongly disagree) in response to the proposal that imports should be limited, over the
total number of respondents per category. Hence, 11.15% or 66 of the 592 males disagreed with the
statement. Those who chose “1” (strongly agree) or “2” (agree) were designated as anti-trade. The
difference between the total and the sum of the two percentages presented are those who neither agreed
nor disagreed with the statement.
As earlier mentioned, the general response is protectionist, given that all the mean values are closer to 1
than to 5, indicating an average response of “agree.”PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 14
Comparative analysis
The results of this study, in quick comparison with the results of five other papers
are shown in Table 6. A highly notable feature of this comparison is that the
Philippine results often deviate from those found in studies for developed econo-
mies.  In particular, the Philippine study yields different signs for four out of the
five significant variables: gender, area of residence or locale, relative income, and
social class.  As previously discussed, there are country characteristics peculiar
to the Philippines that explain these disparities.
To test the robustness of the results, ordered probit regressions using the
same independent variables were ran for the final combined model. Both the signs
and the significance of the variables largely remained the same. Lastly, a simple
OLS regression of the final model also bore similar results in the signs of variables.14
14 These results are available from the authors upon request. Another check of the robustness of the model
was undertaken. Given the Social Weather Stations' unique method of sampling that gave equal weights
to the four study areas, it was conjectured that more representative results might be found if the sample
was to more accurately reflect the distribution of Filipinos across Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. The
random selection of cases was then done, basing the weights on the latest population data from the 2000
census conducted by the National Statistics Office. The model was ran on the smaller data set obtained,
with 665 respondents. The results were largely the same.
Table 6. The study's results compared to others
Philippines USAa Switzerlandb Canadac Cross-countryd Cross-countrye
Variable Demographics
Age No No Yes (-) Yes Yes (-) Yes (-)
Gender Yes (-) * Yes (+) No Not tested Yes (+) Yes (+)
Citizenship Not tested Not tested No Not tested Yes (-) Not tested
Locale Yes (-) * Not tested No Yes Yes (+) Yes (+)
Public Sector Yes (+) Not tested Not tested Not tested Not tested No
Unemployment No No Yes (+) Not tested Not tested No
Self-employment No Not tested Not tested Not tested Not tested Yes (-)
Union Membership No Yes (+) Not tested Yes Yes (+) No
Relative Income Yes (-) * Not tested Not testedYes (not relative) Yes (+) Not tested
Mobility Not tested Not tested Not tested Not tested Not tested Yes (+)
Religion No Not tested Not tested Not tested Not tested Yes (+)
Affiliation with the Right No Yes (+) Not tested Not tested No Not tested
Social Class Yes (-)* Not tested Not tested Yes Yes (+) Not tested
Notes: A positive sign means that an increase in the variable increases the probability that the respondent
is pro-trade.
‘Yes’ (‘No’) means statistically significant (insignificant).  * means variable sign is different from
other studies.
Sources: aScheve and Slaughter (2001); bPasadilla (2002); cBalistreri  (1997); dMayda and Rodrik (2001);
eO’Rourke and Sinnott (2001).PASADILLA AND LIAO 15
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study contributes to the growing empirical literature that seeks out the
determinants of individual trade policy preferences. It finds, based on a national
identity survey undertaken in 2003, that demographic characteristics play a key
role in shaping a person’s opinion on trade. In particular, females in the Philippines
are more likely to be pro-trade than the males. This observation can be attributed
to the unique employment experiences in, as well as the matriarchal culture of,
the nation. Those who rank themselves as belonging to the higher economic
classes and those who earn above the median income are more protectionist, a
result that can be viewed as stemming from their ownership of or strong ties to
local business. Those who are employed in the public sector and whose sources
of income, both direct and indirect, may be threatened by the demolition of trade
barriers, are significantly and notably more anti-trade than those in the private
sector. Another remarkable finding is that those in the rural areas are more open
to trade than urban dwellers, an outcome that may be traced to differing sectoral
experiences of competition.
It is interesting to note that many of the variables operated differently in the
Philippines compared to countries covered by previous studies. This serves to
highlight the differences among nations both in economic terms as well as with
regard to cultural backgrounds. It is important for policymakers all over the world,
especially those who work jointly with international organizations such as the
World Trade Organization, to take note of this reality if they are to gain the
necessary public support for their policy actions.
On the domestic front, meanwhile, policymakers can better focus their infor-
mation campaigns on specific sectors if they first identify which social groups are
more averse toward trade. Additionally, since these results imply that the groups
more resistant to liberalization are not benefiting from it in a tangible way or are
being adversely affected by it, decisionmakers ought to explore the possibilities of
creating safety nets or arranging for transfers toward these particular segments of
society. This way, the benefits of liberalization will be more widely felt throughout
the populace.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2005 16
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